feat(security)!: secure-by-default requireAuth flip + RBAC gates for transfer/restore/purge (#2561 P0) - #2562
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…transfer/restore/purge (#2561 P0) Two production-launch blockers from the authorization gap map (#2561): 1. requireAuth default flip (ADR-0056 D2, enforce stage) — BREAKING - spec: RestApiConfigSchema.requireAuth default(false) → default(true); rest-server normalizeConfig mirrors (?? true). Anonymous /data/* is now denied (401) unless the deployment explicitly opts out. - rest-api-plugin: boot warning now fires only for the EXPLICIT requireAuth:false opt-out, and reads the correct nested config path (the flat read previously warned even when requireAuth was on). - cli serve: keeps the deliberate carve-out — auth-less stacks get an explicit false (nothing could authenticate against them), warned. - verify harness: no override — every dogfood proof now runs on the platform default; anonymous-deny + public-form survival prove the flip (publicFormGrant was the pre-req that unblocked it). - conformance matrix: requireAuth-default-flip experimental → enforced. - REST/client unit tests that dispatch handlers anonymously opt out explicitly (they test routing mechanics, not the auth gate). 2. #1883 — destructive lifecycle ops RBAC gate (pre-mapped) - permission-evaluator: OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION now maps transfer→allowTransfer, restore→allowRestore, purge→allowPurge; modifyAllRecords super-user bypass covers the class. Ops still do not exist in ObjectQL (M2) — but there is no ungated window when they ship; unmapped destructive ops keep failing closed (ADR-0049). - spec: bits re-described [EXPERIMENTAL — not enforced] → [RBAC-gated; operation pending M2]; liveness ledger entries added. - unit tests: deny-without-bit / allow-with-bit / no-cross-leak / modifyAllRecords bypass. Verified: full turbo test suite green (129 tasks); browser-driven showcase run proves anonymous 401, authenticated 200, anonymous public form 200/201 with the data API still closed to the same session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014y5kiH3aPLWtRRRGcVrXcT
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📓 Docs Drift CheckThis PR changes 8 package(s): 97 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:
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…ssion docs The permissions-matrix cheatsheet and ObjectQL security protocol page listed allowTransfer/allowRestore/allowPurge without noting the operations do not exist yet (roadmap M2) — per the declared≠enforced honesty rule, both now carry the pending-M2 / gate-pre-mapped caveat (#1883). Also documents the modifyAllRecords bypass extension to the lifecycle class. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014y5kiH3aPLWtRRRGcVrXcT
…in ADR-0066 future refinements Two findings from the 2026-07 pre-launch authorization assessment that had no ADR home: - ⑧ runtime FLS is block-list + most-permissive union — undeclared fields are visible by default and a field-level deny cannot be expressed until the muting layer (⑦) covers field grants; - ⑨ capability strings need an authoring/publish-gate lint when the D1 registry lands (typos currently fail closed but undiscoverably). Companion engineering issue (not ADR material): #2565 — surface swallowed dbLoader failures in resolvePermissionSets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014y5kiH3aPLWtRRRGcVrXcT
This was referenced Jul 4, 2026
feat(security): permission-set package provenance + bootstrapDeclaredPermissions (ADR-0086 P1)
#2566
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… destructive-op gates Correctness (record-level enforcement for the pre-mapped destructive ops): - security-plugin middleware: extend the write-scope stash, the #1994 pre-image RLS check, and the ADR-0055 controlled-by-parent write gate to cover transfer/restore/purge — the object-level RBAC bit was gated but the row-level defenses only listed update/delete/insert, so a granted user could have destroyed out-of-scope rows by id when the M2 ops ship. purge maps onto the delete RLS class, transfer/restore onto update. New unit test proves a not-owned purge is denied by the pre-image check. Callsite coverage for the default flip: - cli serve: carve-out now keys on (tierEnabled('auth') || hasAuthPlugin) — a stack mounting AuthPlugin explicitly under a minimal tier no longer gets an accidental fail-open override. - plugin-dev: mirror the serve carve-out — an auth-less dev stack gets an explicit requireAuth:false so the local data API isn't bricked. - spec: declare ObjectStackDefinitionSchema.api so the documented opt-out (and the enableProjectScoping/projectResolution/enforceProjectMembership knobs serve.ts already reads) survives defineStack strict parsing instead of being silently stripped. Verified: defineStack now returns the api key. - rest-api-plugin: warn only on an explicit opt-out; add a misplaced-key guard for a flat api.requireAuth (silently ignored under the deny default). - fix two in-tree tests that passed requireAuth at the wrong nesting. Cleanup: - derive the modifyAllRecords write-bypass key set from OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION + DESTRUCTIVE_OPERATIONS (module-level Set, no per-call array) so a future destructive op is covered automatically. Docs / provenance: - regenerate the auto-gen references (requireAuth + allow*{Transfer,Restore, Purge} describe text); CHANGELOG entry for the breaking flip; changeset migration note updated to the defineStack-level api opt-out + scope note. Pre-existing anonymous-posture gap on /meta, dispatcher /graphql, and raw hono /data (surfaces that never call enforceAuth) filed as #2567 — out of scope for this flip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014y5kiH3aPLWtRRRGcVrXcT
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概述
落地 #2561(授权全生命周期缺口地图)framework 侧的两个 P0 上线阻断项:
requireAuth安全默认翻转(ADR-0056 D2 的 enforce 阶段)— BREAKING1. requireAuth 默认翻转(BREAKING)
spec/api/rest-server.zod.tsrequireAuthdefault(false)→default(true)rest/rest-server.tsnormalizeConfig?? false→?? truerest/rest-api-plugin.tsrequireAuth:false退出时触发;并修复了原实现读错嵌套路径(config.api.requireAuth而非config.api.api.requireAuth)导致即使开了 requireAuth 也误报 warn 的 bugcli serveauthtier 的 stack(无人能登录)传显式false+ warnverifyharnessshowcase-anonymous-deny从此证明的是默认值本身requireAuth-default-flip:experimental→enforced(带强制点 + dogfood proof)翻转的前置条件已满足:公开表单经声明派生的
publicFormGrant自授权(ADR-0056 Option A,已有 dogfood 证明),share-link 校验 token 后以系统上下文读取,控制面(/auth//health//discovery)豁免。迁移(一行):刻意公开数据的部署需显式
api: { requireAuth: false }(changeset 已含 FROM→TO 说明)。2. #1883 — 破坏性生命周期操作 RBAC 门
OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION预映射transfer→allowTransfer/restore→allowRestore/purge→allowPurge;modifyAllRecords超级用户旁路覆盖该类操作(对齐 Salesforce "Modify All Data" 语义,管理员不会被锁死)。[EXPERIMENTAL — not enforced]→[RBAC-gated; operation pending M2];liveness 账本补三条显式条目。验证
check:liveness门通过(全部属性已分类)。GET/POST /api/v1/data/*→ 401admin@objectos.ai后同一 URL → 200GET /forms/contact-us→ 200,submit→ 201;同一匿名会话直打数据 API 仍 401(grant 不外溢)requireAuth:false退出(认证门由 rest-auth-gate 单测 + anonymous-deny dogfood 覆盖)。关联
implementation-status.mdx、guides/security.mdx、changesets ×2(major: spec/rest;minor: plugin-security)🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_014y5kiH3aPLWtRRRGcVrXcT
Generated by Claude Code